Historical research by Politica has found that United Bermuda Party politicians kept secret a new ministerial code of conduct when it was first touted in the early 1970s.
In 1972, the then UBP government refused to publish the new code of conduct because of fear that the Opposition PLP would make “political capital” out of it.
This meant that, unless there was a leak, there was no way in which the Opposition, the media or the public could find out about the code’s existence until the UBP would first lose office in November 1998.
This was despite acknowledgement from one unnamed senior party figure at the time that ministers “inevitably obtained some advantage in their private business arising from their membership” of Cabinet (then called Executive Council).
As chair of Bermuda’s National Anti-Money Laundering Committee Cheryl-Ann Lister told a conference on tackling corruption in the Caribbean at University College in the Cayman Islands in March 2014, the current document was developed in 2002.
The code, she noted, is aimed at “govern[ing] the actions of members of Cabinet and prevent[ing] corrupt activities”.
In its 2012 form, the document consists of 23 pages covering issues such as general principles that apply to Cabinet Ministers, Collective Responsibility, Cabinet Documents and Ministers’ Overseas Visits.
According to the October 2013 report of the current One Bermuda Alliance government’s Spending and Government Efficiency Commission, ministers are “expected to have more than a passing familiarity with the document”.
The relevant provision relates to allegations that during the recent “Jetgate” scandal, OBA ministers misled parliament, in contravention of Section A(v) of the Code, which states that “it is of paramount importance that ministers give accurate and truthful information to Parliament”.
It goes on to suggest that “Ministers who knowingly mislead Parliament will be expected to offer their resignations to the Premier”.
Another claim is that Tourism Minister Shawn Crockwell, then-Premier Craig Cannonier and then-Attorney General Mark Pettingill broke the Code of Conduct by accepting a private jet trip and hotel accommodation from US tycoon Nathan Landow.
The relevant provision here is Section B, 17.1, which states that “no Minister or public servant should accept gifts, hospitality or services from anyone which would, or might appear to, place him or her under any obligation”.
With the news that the OBA, directly or indirectly, benefited from a campaign contribution of between $300,000 and $350,000, the allegations of impropriety, which led to Cannonier’s downfall earlier this month, took an even graver turn.
The Ministerial Code of Conduct is a relatively newly publicised feature of the accountability machinery in both the UK and Bermuda.
The Code of Conduct for UK ministers, contained in the document “Questions of Procedure for Ministers”, was only revealed to the public in 1992 “following an Open Government initiative by the Prime Minister John Major”, according to House of Commons librarian Oonagh Gay.
It was not until after recommendations by the UK Committee on Standards in Public Life, which was set up in October 1994 in the wake of the UK’s cash-for-questions scandal, that a full ministerial code of conduct was published (in June 2001).
However, Britain’s code of behaviour for ministers remained dependent on the personal whims of the Prime Minister who was in the office at the time and remained unpublished, according to the diaries of Tony Benn, who served as a Labour Cabinet Minister in the 1960s and 1970s.
Until the early 2000s, however, and despite its own falling short in this regard, Britain consistently attempted to push a ministerial code of conduct onto what were then known as its Dependent Territories such as Bermuda.
London lobbied for the enactment of a ministerial code of conduct in Bermuda in the early 1970s.
Our research has found that, in 1972, the British Government’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the department responsible for dealing with Bermuda in London, insisted upon the implementation of a code as a quid pro quo for reforms to the Island’s constitution.
The draft code was based upon one already in force in the British colony of Gibraltar. It set out guidelines for ministers to follow in order to keep public and private interests separate.
The draft was approved by the British Foreign Secretary in October 1972.
At that time, United Bermuda Party Government Leader Sir Edward Richards wrote that the Code would ‘be made public on some suitable occasion, either towards the end of the forthcoming debate in the legislature on constitutional change, or perhaps preferably when the constitution is actually amended’.
He added: “At that time the code will also be supplied to ministers for their observance.”
However, by February 1973, Sir Edward had changed his mind, noting in a memorandum that “the code should not be published”.
The reason, he wrote, was that “the document might well be used in attempts to make political capital out of alleged breaches of the code, either in the past or in the future”.
“I propose therefore that, instead of publishing the code, a copy should be sent, as a matter of routine, under confidential cover, to each minister as and when he takes office for the first time and that he should be asked to acknowledge receipt.”
Ever since the beginning of party politics in Bermuda in February 1963, Bermuda had been dominated, informally and then formally, by its white oligarchy and by its political arm, the UBP, founded in August 1964.
The UBP’s formation was the response by the political and economic elite to the founding of Bermuda’s first political party – the Bermuda Progressive Labour Party which represented the largely black working class, and advocated social, economic and electoral equity and an end to racial discrimination.
But it wasn’t just the local elites that felt perturbed by the new entity.
Governors Lord Martonmere (1964-1972) and Sir Edwin Leather (1973-1977) expressed distaste for the PLP, as well as, on Martonmere’s part at least, racially-charged antipathy towards Bermuda’s Opposition Party.
In February 1971, for instance, Martonmere told FCO official Richard Posnett that he wanted to resist changes to constituency boundaries, which inflated the value of votes in affluent, white areas, because he was afraid of power falling into the hands of “extreme black elements”.
The UK Government had first suggested the Code of Conduct in communications with the Governor Lord Martonmere, because “the system by which Members of the Executive Council [Cabinet] with ministerial powers are permitted to retain their private professional and business interests is open to objection in principle”.
The UK Government was motivated in this stance, at least in part, by its view that having a such a code of conduct would be especially desirable if the opposition PLP ever came to power in Bermuda.
In a Foreign Office memorandum of October 1971, an official on the Dependent Territories desk objected to the idea of easing off on pressure for a code of conduct: “Her Majesty’s Government must consider whether it would be prepared to dispense with a Ministerial Code of Conduct should some other party form a future government in Bermuda.”
The Code was originally proposed after Posnett visited Bermuda on a fact-finding trip in February 1971.
One (UBP) member, Posnett said, “took the view that the issue was too important for compromise, that a full ministerial system must be introduced”.
He said that even present [ministers] “who were above reproach inevitably obtained some advantage in their private business arising from their membership of the Executive Council [Cabinet]”.
The MP, Posnett added, “thought it vital that the [Code of Conduct] should be hanged under the present regime before another, perhaps less scrupulous, Government could be elected”.
In an earlier memorandum of April that year, another official argued that, although Bermuda required “checks and balances” to prevent corruption, the lessons of white minority corruption in the Bahamas should not be transferred too uniformly on Bermuda.
In the document, Britain’s Overseas Labour Advisor George Foggon wrote: “Bay Street (in the Bahamas) and Front Street have a slightly sinister sound and are very often linked together but my own belief is that Bermuda has been more fortunate than the Bahamas in the quality and probity of its ‘white knights’.
“It might be a mistake to transfer too arbitrarily the unfortunate lessons of the Bahamas into consideration of Bermuda affairs.”
However, despite these fears, it appears that the ministerial code of conduct remained private during the 1970s, ‘80s and ‘90s, at least until after a PLP government had been elected for the first time in November 1998.
This code’s publication in 2002 occurred in the context of a more aggressively interventionist stance on the part of the UK Government following the publication of its 1999 White Paper.
This document noted that some of the 14 remaining British Overseas Territories needed to “make progress in reforming and modernising” their laws but that Britain “would prefer to see Overseas Territory governments enact the necessary reforms themselves”.
The UK Government’s 2012 White Paper took this further, noting explicitly that it was “important that everyone in the UK and the Territories in public life acts in accordance with the highest standards”.
It went on to quote the seven principles of public life, devised by the UK Committee on Standards in Public Life, which include selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and leadership.
In particular the “integrity” requirement stipulates: “Holders of public office should not place themselves under any financial or other obligation to outside individuals or organisations that might seek to influence them in the performance of their official duties.”
The “objectivity” demand stresses: “In carrying out public business, including making public appointments, awarding contracts, or recommending individuals for rewards and benefits, holders of public office should make choices on merit.”
A British Foreign and Commonwealth Office spokesman told Politica that ministers from the British Overseas Territories were working together “on engaging in a peer review process… to further strengthen codes of conduct and integrity”.
“This followed a commitment at their previous meeting in 2012 to adopt and implement seven specific ‘principles of public life’ and put in place and implement codes of practice for Ministers, parliamentarians and public servants.”
In November 2013, the FCO noted that progress along the lines of the seven principles was being made in Gibraltar, where “the draft of a tailor‐made ministerial code of conduct” was to be adopted in 2014, and in the British Virgin Islands, where both a “new public service code and public service act” were about to be promulgated.
In the Cayman Islands, the next largest Overseas Territory after Bermuda, a code of conduct for Cabinet was prepared as part of a revised Cabinet Manual, and a Standards in Public Life Bill, “setting clear and accountable standards for all public officials”, was published and is expected “to be debated in the Legislative Assembly in early 2015”.
In Anguilla, work had begun on a Code of Conduct for ministers, while in the Falkland Islands there was a “management code for public servants and a Code of Conduct for members of the Legislative Assembly”.
In St Helena, work was “underway” on a code of conduct for public servants including ministers.
Finally, in the Turks and Caicos Islands, an independent Integrity Commission was established in 2012.
This body “agreed a Code of Conduct for all persons in public life (including ministers, members of the House of Assembly, senior public servants and members of statutory boards”.
Scandals in the Turks and Caicos and the Cayman Islands in 2009 and 2012, which led respectively to the resignation of Premiers Michael Misick and McKeeva Bush, have refocused attention on questions of transparency, integrity and conflicts of interest in the Overseas Territories.
The FCO spokesman noted that Britain would “continue to encourage best practice in public life and electoral procedures, including finances and independent monitoring”.
In this context, it seems Bermuda is well-positioned when it comes to having high standards on preventing corruption in public life.
As Lister noted earlier this year, provisions to tighten up the law have recently been added to the Parliament Act 1957, the Parliamentary Election Act 1978, the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1977, the Quarantine Act 1946 and the Criminal Code 1907.
She noted: “Offences in this area include asking, receiving, obtaining; or even attempting or agreeing to receive or obtain a bribe or other such type of compensation.”
In May 2013, just before the ‘Jetgate’ scandal came to light, then Attorney General Mark Pettingill, in an interview with Ayo Johnson, then with Bermuda’s daily newspaper The Royal Gazette, called for the implementation of a ministerial code of conduct.
He thus appeared to be unaware that Bermuda already had such a code, even though each minister is issued with a copy of the document when they take office.
Meanwhile, it seems the “Jetgate” affair, and the question of whether Ministers are held to account for breaches of the code, have increased the chance of damage to Bermuda’s global reputation for transparency.
On May 21, two days after Cannonier’s resignation, the UK’s influential Economist Intelligence Unit noted that “political stability has been undermined” in Bermuda and “the OBA government may struggle to survive if wrongdoing by senior party members is proven”.
As Shadow Health Minister Zane DeSilva asked during the Motion to Adjourn in the House of Assembly on May 16: “Free jet trip. A free ride, free hotels. Talking to a developer that wants to develop in Bermuda and give them 300,000 at the end of it. My question is: Does this ministerial code of conduct not mean anything to anyone on [the OBA] side of the house?”
In late May 2013, Cannonier defended himself against Opposition charges that he had breached the Code of Conduct by suggesting that he had “taken the advice of the Attorney General [Mr Pettingill] on the matter and was assured that the trip did not present a conflict”.
“This was basically an exchange of information”, Cannonier said in the House of Assembly of the meeting in Washington DC. “There was no negotiation.”
And during the crisis talks and internal investigation launched by his own party following publication of our story Selling Bermuda, Cannonier is said to have blamed the advice of his AG who responded in his defence that he had not been fully informed.
The fact that Cannonier was relying on the legal advice of someone who was nearly or equally as embroiled in the affair as he was himself should have raised eyebrows at the time.
Moreover, Cannonier’s subsequent resignation established the fact, as he himself noted in his final message to the nation, that there had been a ‘failure of transparency’ on his part as leader of the government.
Pettingill has since resigned his position as Attorney General. And Opposition Leader Marc Bean has filed notice of a parliamentary motion to censure both the former AG and the Tourism Minister – setting the stage for a marathon debate that will no doubt test the OBA’s commitment to principles or party – or at the very least provide a finely nuanced discussion on what those principles actually mean in practice.
The question is whether Bermuda should allow other public servants currently holding office to fall beneath standards which act as something of a safeguard for the people of the island against the abuse of power by those in charge.
This article belongs to Politica ! The original article can be found here: Bermuda’s party of ‘white knights’ blocked publication of anti-corruption measures
Politica © 2024 - All Rights Reserved